Democratic constitutional design and public policy : analysis and evidence
- edited by Roger D. Congleton and Birgitta Swedenborg.
- Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, c2006.
Where to find it
The variety of constitutional designs found in democratic governments has important effects on policy choices and outcomes. That is the conclusion reached in Democratic Constitutional Design and Public Policy, in which the constitutional procedures and constraints through which laws and public policies are adopted--election laws, the general architecture of government, the legal system, and methods for amendment and reform--are evaluated for their political and economic effects. Leading scholars, many of them pioneers in the new field of constitutional political economy, survey and extend recent empirical evidence on the policy effects of different constitutional procedures and restraints. Their findings are relevant not only to such dramatic changes as democratic transition throughout the world and the development of a European constitution but also to the continuing process of constitutional reform in established democracies. Using the tools of rational choice analysis, the contributors approach the question of constitutional design from public choice, new institutionalist, and new political economy perspectives. Drawing on empirical evidence largely from the OECD countries, the book analyzes such issues as the policy effects of direct (as opposed to representative) democracy, democratic accountability in presidential as compared to parliamentary government, bicameralism and its relation to stable policies, the relative effectiveness of centralized and decentralized governments, the civil and legal regulatory system as a nation's "economic constitution," and the link between constitutional stability and the amendment process.
John C. Bradbury, Roger D. Congleton, W. Mark Crain, Daniel Diermeier, Lars Feld, Bruno Frey, James D. Gwartney, Randall Holcombe, Hülya Eraslan, Brian Knight, Robert A. Lawson Antonio Merlo, Dennis Mueller, Torsten Persson, Bjørn Erik Rasch, Thomas Stratmann, Alois Stutzer, Birgitta Swedenborg, Guido Tabellini, Stefan Voigt, Barry Weingast
- Contributors p. vii
- Acknowledgments p. ix
- 1 Introduction: Rational Choice Politics and Institutions p. 1
- I Voting Systems, Agency, and Public Policy p. 37
- 2 Direct Democracy: Designing a Living Constitution p. 39
- 3 Constitutions and Economic Policy p. 81
- 4 Party-Line Voting and Committee Assignments in the Mixed-Member System p. 111
- II Legislative Decisions and Structure and Policy Outcomes p. 131
- 5 The Effects of Constitutions on Coalition Governments in Parliamentary Democracies p. 133
- 6 On the Merits of Bicameral Legislatures: Intragovernmental Bargaining and Policy Stability p. 163
- 7 Bicameralism and Political Compromise in Representative Democracy p. 189
- III Decentralization and Federalism p. 203
- 8 Federalism: A Constitutional Perspective p. 205
- 9 Common Tax Pool Problems in Federal Systems p. 229
- IV Legal Institutions, Regulation, and Economic Growth p. 249
- 10 Judicial Independence and Economic Development p. 251
- 11 Constitutions and Prosperity: The Impact of Legal and Economic Institutions on the Wealth of Nations p. 289
- V Constitutional Design, Durability, and Stability p. 317
- 12 Amendment Procedures and Constitutional Stability p. 319
- 13 Designing Constitutional Stability p. 343
- Index p. 367
This item is about
- Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, c2006.
- Papers originally presented at a conference sponsored by the Center for Business and Policy Studies.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
- viii, 373 p. : ill. ; 23 cm.
- Genre or Form
- OCLC Number
- Other Identifiers
- LCCN: 2005056241
British national bibliography: GBA647598
International Standard Article Number: 9780262532808